ICC war crimes ASEAN gap

 Here’s a breakdown of the 41 states that have neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute and the 29 states that signed but did not ratify it — meaning they are not full members of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as of 2025:

41 States That Have Neither Signed Nor Ratified the Rome Statute

These countries have no formal legal ties to the ICC:

• Asia-Pacific: China, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Vietnam, Nepal, Bhutan, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand

• Middle East & North Africa: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Oman, UAE, Bahrain, Lebanon

• Africa: Angola, Eritrea, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Cameroon

• Europe: Belarus

• Americas: Cuba, Nicaragua

• Others: North Korea, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan

29 States That Signed But Did Not Ratify the Rome Statute

These countries expressed initial support but never completed the ratification process:

• Americas: United States, Haiti, Jamaica

• Asia-Pacific: Russia, Israel, Pakistan, Bangladesh (ratified later), Philippines (withdrew), Sudan (signed but not ratified), Afghanistan (ratified later), Armenia (ratified in 2023)

• Middle East: Qatar, Kuwait, Morocco, Algeria

• Africa: Libya, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe

• Europe: Turkey, Ukraine (ratified in 2024), Monaco

Some of these states have withdrawn their signature (e.g. USA, Israel, Sudan), meaning they no longer intend to join the ICC.

ASEAN’s ICC Dilemma: Gaps, Aggression, and Accountability in a Fractured Region

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was founded on a promise: to end impunity for the world’s gravest crimes. Yet in Southeast Asia, that promise remains largely unfulfilled. 

Of ASEAN’s ten member states, only Cambodia and the Philippines have ratified the Rome Statute — and the latter withdrew in 2019 under President Rodrigo Duterte. The rest — including Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, Brunei, and Singapore — remain outside the ICC’s jurisdiction.

This ratification gap has real consequences. It limits the ICC’s ability to investigate crimes of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in a region increasingly marked by instability and militarization.

Crimes of Aggression: From Drones to Bombardment

The ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression — defined as the use of armed force by a state in violation of the UN Charter — was activated in 2018. But its reach is narrow: it applies only to states that have ratified the Kampala Amendments and not opted out.

This limitation is starkly visible in recent conflicts:

• Myanmar: The ICC is investigating crimes against humanity committed against the Rohingya, including deportation and persecution. In 2024, Prosecutor Karim Khan requested an arrest warrant for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. But Myanmar is not an ICC member, and the court’s jurisdiction hinges on crimes committed in Bangladesh, a state party.

• Thailand-Cambodia border war (2025): A dramatic escalation saw Thai F-16s bomb Cambodian territory, with civilian casualties and mass displacement. Cambodia has called it “unprovoked aggression” and referred the matter to the UN Security Council. Yet neither country has ratified the aggression amendments, and Thailand is not an ICC member — leaving the court powerless to intervene.

• Drone warfare: Across Africa and increasingly in Asia, drones are being used in ways that blur the line between surveillance and targeted strikes. ASEAN states are rapidly acquiring counter-drone tech, but there is no regional framework to regulate drone use in conflict zones or hold perpetrators accountable.

Myanmar: ICC’s Limited Reach

The ICC’s investigation into Myanmar’s 2017 crackdown on the Rohingya is a landmark case. It relies on Bangladesh’s ratification to assert jurisdiction over cross-border crimes. In 2024, the court requested arrest warrants for Myanmar’s military leaders, but the junta rejected the ICC’s authority.

ASEAN’s response has been tepid. While leaders issued statements urging ceasefires and humanitarian aid, they have not supported ICC accountability — reflecting the bloc’s longstanding principle of non-interference.

Thailand-Cambodia: A Border War Ignored by the ICC

The July 2025 clashes between Thailand and Cambodia — the deadliest since 2011 — involved airstrikes, artillery, and civilian deaths. Cambodia accused Thailand of violating its sovereignty and called for ICC intervention. But with neither country a party to the Rome Statute, and no Security Council referral, the ICC cannot act.

ASEAN’s credibility is on the line. Its failure to mediate or enforce peace undermines its claim to regional centrality. Civil society groups have urged Malaysia, as ASEAN chair, to broker a ceasefire and protect civilians — but the bloc remains divided.

Philippines: Duterte, Drugs, and the ICC

The Philippines’ brief ICC membership ended in 2019 after the court began investigating Duterte’s war on drugs. In 2024, Duterte was detained in The Hague on charges of crimes against humanity. His daughter, Vice President Sara Duterte, faced impeachment for alleged corruption and threats against President Marcos — but the Supreme Court dismissed the case on a technicality.

President Marcos has signalled openness to re-engaging with the ICC, but political divisions run deep. The Duterte legacy — marked by impunity and extrajudicial killings — remains a flashpoint.

Conclusion: A Region at a Crossroads

ASEAN’s ICC gap is more than a legal technicality — it’s a structural weakness that shields perpetrators and undermines justice. As drone warfare, border conflicts, and authoritarian crackdowns escalate, the need for accountability grows more urgent.

Ratifying the Rome Statute — and the Kampala Amendments — would send a powerful signal: that Southeast Asia is ready to confront impunity and u

Why the UK Has Not Ratified the Kampala Amendments

• The UK maintains that acts of aggression should be determined by the UN Security Council, not the ICC — especially since aggression can be politically charged.

• Concerns over sovereignty and military autonomy, including RAF and SAS operations abroad.

• Fear that UK military actions (e.g. in Syria, Yemen, Libya) could be politically reinterpreted under ICC aggression rules